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LINE PILOT PERFORMANCE OF MEMORY ITEMS
Howard Au
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group*
P.O. Box 3707 MC 67-TC
Seattle, WA 98124, USA
* This research was paid for through out-of-pocket expenses by the author. It was conducted while the author was a
student at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in partial fulfillment for the degree of M.S. Aeronautics.
An evaluation of Boeing 737 line pilot performance of memory items in 5 abnormal checklists was performed in a
single-blind experiment using tabletop exercises at the crew base of a major U.S. airline. A study of 16 pilots shows
that performance of memory items results in errors in identifying the failure, selecting the proper checklist to be
completed, and checklist step errors.
Introduction
Some system failures that can occur on commercial
airliners require flight crews to perform checklist steps
from memory prior to referring to the checklist. These
steps, called memory items or recall steps, are for time
critical actions crucial to the safe continuation of the
flight (e.g., preventing severe aircraft damage or crew
incapacitation). Typically, line pilots do not study
memory items except in preparation for a proficiency
check (PC), usually every 6 or 12 months. They arrive
for their evaluation prepared to be tested on the recall
of the memory items. Their performance in these
evaluations may not reflect their performance on the
line, months after a PC.
This study examines whether line pilots are familiar
enough with the memory items to perform all of them
reliably, without prior knowledge that they will be
evaluated. It was predicted that the performance of the
memory items would show errors of commission,
omission, and order due to the pilots’ infrequent
review of the memory items. This impromptu method
of evaluation more closely resembles an unanticipated
inflight emergency. This paper reviews some of the
literature on performance under stress and then
discusses the results pertaining to errors in
identification of failures and errors in checklist
selection. Although checklist step omission and order
errors were observed, this paper will focus on the
commission errors in the completion of checklist steps.
Human Performance Under Stress
An inflight emergency requiring timely action imposes
a great deal of stress on the flight crew. Previous studies
have shown that recall under high-stress conditions is
more prone to errors than recall under low-stress
conditions [8]. These errors, as they relate to checklist
use, may include errors in identifying the abnormal
condition, selecting the correct checklist, and errors of

commission (adding steps or performing steps
incorrectly), omission (missing steps), or order
(completing steps in the wrong sequence).
Baddeley [1] presented a review of studies that included
performance of deep-sea divers, combat aviators in
actual combat, soldiers in simulated emergencies, and
skydivers. These studies evaluated the performance of
manual dexterity tasks, tracking tasks, and attention to
peripheral cues. They showed that danger manifests
itself in human performance through a narrowing of
attention or through an increase in time to complete a
manual dexterity task. The narrowing of attention can
potentially lead to increased performance only if the
task being performed is understood to be important.
However, performance on tasks made to seem
peripheral during an emergency can deteriorate [3].
Similarly, if the task is so complex as to require
attention to numerous cues, the narrowing of attention
will result in an inability to integrate relevant task
information and an inability to conduct a proper
assessment of the situation [6].
It is possible that training can mitigate some of these
effects. However, even though pilots receive regular
training in emergency procedures in simulators, that
does not mean they are unaffected by the stress of an
actual emergency. An emergency in a simulator is not
perceived as life-threatening. If the pilot fails, the
simulator can be reset for another attempt. Unless a
pilot has had repeated experience in dealing with a
truly dangerous emergency, performance in a real
emergency could be similar to a novice. It has been
shown that subjects are able to inhibit fear and prevent
it from affecting their performance only if they are
repeatedly exposed to a dangerous situation [1]. Due to
the reliability of today’s airliners, it is unlikely for the
average airline pilot to have this kind of exposure in an
airplane.
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Stress Effects on Problem Analysis
It is possible that performance on infrequent tasks,
such as identifying the root cause of multiple failures
or shutting down an engine inflight, is affected more
by stress than are common tasks. This is “an effect that
has profound implications for the design of procedures
to be used under the stressful conditions of
emergency” [9].
This effect can sometimes be observed when people
continue with a planned series of actions they are
familiar with even when the actions appear
unsuccessful or inappropriate. By acting before
analyzing the situation, the operator may exacerbate
the situation, which may induce more stress, and make
it increasingly difficult to identify the original cause of
the failure. This is related to an effect referred to as
confirmation bias, where a person attends to cues that
support a belief, and discounts cues that contradict the
belief. Confirmation bias has been demonstrated in the
use of automation and even in the diagnosis of
everyday situations [4, 5, 7]. Other studies have shown
that under stress, subjects are less effective and more
disorganized at considering alternative solutions and
incorporate less data in decision-making [6].
Stress Effects on Completion of Checklist Steps
Discussions with pilot participants in this study suggest
that the requirement to perform certain actions from
memory implies a sense of urgency in the performance
of those actions. This introduces another potential
source of error due to the loss of accuracy as speed is
increased, an effect that is best described by the speedaccuracy operating characteristic (SAOC). The SAOC
is a function that represents the inverse relationship
between accuracy and speed. As the performance of a
task requires more speed, accuracy is reduced until it
approaches chance. If accuracy is excessively
emphasized, then the time required to complete a task
increases greatly with little improvement in accuracy.

time resulted from omission errors by crews
performing memory items. They occasionally omitted
deploying the speedbrake, causing the airplane to
descend slower. On the other hand, crews that
performed the procedure by reference to the checklist
did not make these errors, but took longer to complete
the checklist. Regardless of the time required to read
through the checklist, the crews performing the
procedure by reference descended to a safe altitude in
less time because of the use of the speedbrake.
The perceived requirement to perform checklist steps
quickly from memory during high-stress situations is at
odds with the need to perform those checklist steps
accurately. There is a potential for loss of accuracy as
the performance speed increases. Attempting 100%
accuracy would require so much time to complete a
checklist that other flying tasks would be disrupted.
There is a tradeoff between getting the procedure done
quickly, and getting it done while minimizing the
possibility of error.
The following methodology seeks to identify examples
of these errors in the flight operations domain. Even
though inducing a level of stress similar to that of a
real emergency was not possible in this study, it was
hypothesized that errors of commission, omission, and
order would still be observed.
Methodology
Participants
Sixteen 737 line pilots at a crew base of a major U.S.
airline volunteered for the study. These pilots were
already at the crew base either in preparation for a
flight or returning from one. Participants were
accepted without regard to experience level and
participated in the study individually and not as a
member of a two person crew. Pilots reported being
trained in both the 737 Classic and 737 NG.
Procedure

Wickens & Hollands [9] summarize studies that
demonstrate the effects of stress, induced by speed or
by threat of bodily harm, on performance accuracy.
For example, bomb-disposal experts performing under
stress made more errors while working faster, and
subjects who were threatened with the potential for
electric shock gave up on problem-solving activities
early.
Using an emergency descent as an example, an earlier
study [2] showed that crews performing an emergency
descent from memory took longer to descend than
crews using the checklist. The difference in descent

In order to avoid any priming effects in the recall of
their emergency procedures, subjects were not
informed of the purpose of the research. They were
instead briefed that:
 the research was on the suitability of the 737
alerting system,
 they would be asked to talk through five
procedures, and
 the results from this study may be relevant to the
design of a new alerting system in future airplanes.
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A brief survey of experience was collected. This
included data on total number of hours flown, their
time in airplane type, flying time since last PC, and
their crew position.

who did not have military experience came from
various corporate jets, commuter planes, other large
commercial airlines, and corporate turboprops.
Checklist Selection Errors

Subjects were seated in front of a poster of the flight
deck. For consistency, a color poster of the 737 Classic
flight deck was used. Five non-alerted abnormal
procedures that contain memory items were used. They
included aborted engine start, engine limit/surge/stall,
rapid depressurization, runaway stabilizer trim, and
dual engine failure.
The experimenter began each scenario by describing a
normal flight situation, and then interjecting cues that
suggest a particular failure. Subjects were asked to
react to the cues as they would inflight, performing any
procedures they felt were necessary. When responses
to the scenarios seemed vague, the researcher probed
the participants to encourage them to elaborate. The
participants were provided with their airline Quick
Reference Handbook (QRH), and were allowed to
select the checklist they felt was most appropriate for
the situation. Each session lasted approximately
30 minutes.
Results

The participants in this study were 16 current line
pilots at a major U.S. airline. Of those pilots, one was
eliminated from the final analysis because he
determined during the interview that an evaluation of
the performance of memory items was the goal of the
research.

Minimum
Maximum

Checklists selected

# of
pilots

Aborted Engine Start

10

Engine Low Oil Pressure
Engine Low Oil Pressure > Aborted Engine
Start

2
2

None

1

Table 2. Aborted Engine Start Checklist Selection

Demographics

Mean
Standard
Deviation

When pilots were given an engine start condition with no
oil pressure indications, four pilots initially chose the
Engine Low Oil Pressure checklist. Upon reading that
checklist, two of those pilots realized it was not
appropriate for the situation, and correctly selected the
Aborted Engine Start checklist. One pilot reported that
there was no checklist needed, and that a maintenance call
would be the only action required after completing the
engine shutdown. The remaining 10 pilots correctly
referenced the Aborted Engine Start checklist (Table 2).

Total
Time
13,40
4

Months
Since PC

Time in
Type

Weeks
Since
QRH
Used

6

6,614

13

6,829

4

6,535

17

4,500
25,00
0

0.5

400

1

11

20,000

52

Table 1. Demographics
Data from the experience survey is presented in Table
1. Nine First Officers and six Captains participated.
Two pilots incorrectly reported their total time and
time in type, and their numbers were excluded. Seven
pilots had prior military experience ranging from land
and carrier-based fighters to large transports. Pilots

The Engine Limit/Surge/Stall scenario had the lowest
identification rate (Table 3). Only two pilots
referenced the correct checklist. One of those two
selected the Engine Fire/Severe Damage/Separation
checklist first. The remaining pilots referenced various
checklists,
including
Engine
Fire/Severe
Damage/Separation, Engine Failure/Shutdown, and
Engine Overheat.

Checklists selected
Engine Limit/Surge/Stall (Correct)
Engine Fire > Engine Limit / Surge / Stall
(Experimenter prompted the correct checklist
by saying the engine was “surging”)
Engine Failure

# of
pilots
1
1
6

Engine Fire

4

Engine Overheat > Engine Fire

1

Engine Overheat

1

Engine Overheat > Engine Failure

1

Table 3. Engine Limit / Surge / Stall Checklist
Selection
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The remaining three scenarios had few checklist
selection errors. One pilot selected the Auto
Fail/Unscheduled Pressurization Change checklist
during a rapid depressurization. Another pilot
performed the Stabilizer Out Of Trim checklist in the
runaway stabilizer scenario.
Checklist Step Errors
The majority of checklist step errors occurred during
the completion of the dual engine failure memory
items. Many of those were commission errors. These
included:
• bringing the thrust levers back to idle before
attempting to restart the engine,
• advancing the thrust levers as the engines failed in
an attempt to get them to restart,
• starting the APU to try an assisted start,
• waiting three seconds to attempt a restart after
shutting off the fuel,
• placing the ignition selector to both, and
• using engine anti-ice (Figure 1).

Engine bleed switches..........................On
Isolation valve...................................Close
Oxygen masks & regulators....On/100%
Crew communications............Establish
Pressurization mode selector.........Man
Outflow valve.................................Close

Figure 2. Rapid Depressurization Commission Errors.
Four pilots made commission errors in the completion
of the runaway stabilizer trim checklist by attempting
to activate the electric trim switches in the direction
opposite the runaway. One of those four pilots stated
that he would also attempt to engage a different
autopilot in the hopes that it would not experience the
same malfunction (Figure 3).

Control column.....................Hold firmly
Autopilot (if engaged)...........Disengage
Electric trim in opposite direction
Engage other autopilot

Ignition Selector.................................Both
Thrust Levers...............................Advance
Engine Start Levers.............................Idle
Engine Start Switches........................Flt
Turn around

If runaway stabilizer continues:
Trim cutout switches...............Cutout
Trim wheel.....................Grasp & hold

Figure 3. Runaway Stabilizer Commission Errors.

Thrust Levers...................................Close
Engine Anti-ice......................................On
Engine Start Levers......................Cutoff
EGT decreasing:
Wait three seconds:
Engine Start Levers...........................Idle
APU...................................................Start
If EGT exceeds 950°C:
Allow engines to overheat
Repeat above steps
Attempt restart one at a time

Figure 1. Dual Engine Failure Commission Errors.
Bold items indicate the correct steps. Arrows indicate
all additional steps performed by the 15 pilots.
In the rapid depressurization scenario, two pilots
included additional steps:
•
•

verifying the engine bleeds were on, and
closing the bleed air isolation valve (Figure 2).

Discussion
Checklist Selection Errors
When presented with cues to an abnormal situation,
pilots sometimes omit a thorough analysis of the
situation. This became evident through previous
observations of pilots performing abnormal procedures
in simulators and anecdotal evidence. The pilots in this
study demonstrated a tendency to fixate on the most
prominent cue and perform the checklist appropriate to
that cue. However, a thorough analysis of the situation
can reveal that the single most prominent cue does not
always lead the pilot to the correct checklist.
There were 23 checklist selection errors. With the
following three exceptions, the errors appear to be
caused by the pilots’ fixation on a single cue.
Experimenter error in describing the rapid
depressurization failure to one pilot gave the
impression that the cabin altitude began to stabilize at
approximately 12,000 feet, which led him to the Auto
Fail/Unscheduled Pressurization Change checklist.
Another error was due to a pilot’s belief that no
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checklist was required for an aborted engine start.
Finally, one pilot referred to the Dual Engine Failure
checklist as the Engine Inflight Start checklist, but
performed the correct memory items.
The remaining 20 checklist selection errors appear to be
caused by pilots fixating on a single cue, and performing
the checklist that appears most related to that cue. For
example, in the aborted engine start, the cues given to
the pilots were the continued illumination of the LOW
OIL PRESSURE light and no oil pressure indication.
Four pilots stated that, given those cues, they would
complete the Low Oil Pressure checklist.
Two of those pilots realized the Low Oil Pressure
checklist was inappropriate by considering the
reasonableness of the checklist steps they were
reading. The checklist directed the pilots to the Engine
Failure/Shutdown checklist, which is meant for an
inflight engine shutdown. A shutdown of an engine on
the ground is simpler than a shutdown inflight and
these pilots determined that irrelevant steps such as:
starting the APU, maintaining fuel balance, and
preparing for a single-engine landing, indicated they
were in the wrong checklist. However, one pilot who
entered the Engine Failure checklist from the Low Oil
Pressure checklist did not consider the appropriateness
of the checklist steps he was reading, and showed a
tendency for perseveration. He went so far as to
complete the Engine Failure checklist, reading aloud
and bypassing irrelevant steps to complete the only
step required to actually shutdown the engine while on
the ground.
In the engine limit scenario, the 14 subjects who did
not select the correct checklist instead performed the
checklist that most closely reflected the cue they said
was the most important. One pilot initially selected the
Engine Fire/Severe Damage/Separation checklist, but
turned to the Engine Limit/Surge/Stall checklist only
after the experimenter said the engine was “surging”.
The term “surging” was not used as a cue in any other
scenarios. Pilots who were primarily concerned by the
abnormal “popping” or “banging” noises referenced
the Engine Fire/Severe Damage/Separation checklist,
stating that they believed the noises suggested severe
engine damage. Pilots who considered excessive
exhaust gas temperature (EGT) to be more important
completed checklists related to overheat conditions.
The pilot who referenced the Stabilizer Out Of Trim
checklist in the runaway stabilizer scenario did so
because he believed the STAB OUT OF TRIM light
would be illuminated.

Checklist Step Errors
There appear to be consistent patterns in the observed
checklist step errors. Many of the commission errors
appear to result from the pilots’ creativity in dealing
with an abnormal situation. It was observed that many
pilots perform steps in addition to what was required
based on their understanding of how the airplane
systems functioned, even though their understanding of
the systems may be incorrect. Some pilots explained
that the performance of some additional steps occurs
because of knowledge of the intricacies of a complex
system gained over years of experience or knowledge
of common and simple failure modes, which are not
addressed in the checklist. This may resolve the
situation without the need for a checklist. In other
cases, an incorrect or incomplete understanding of the
system may lead pilots to perform additional steps that
delay the completion of steps necessary to resolve the
situation, or that may exacerbate the condition.
The pilots’ creativity in dealing with certain situations
was most evident in the dual engine failure scenario,
which had the highest number of commission errors. A
possible explanation was apparent in the pilots’
response to this scenario: a desire to “do whatever it
takes” to resolve a serious situation. Their perception
was that this failure was so severe that they would
exercise their authority as pilots, beyond what is
written in the checklist, in an attempt to get an engine
running, regardless of the consequences. Some pilots’
willingness to allow the engines to exceed EGT and
overheat, contrary to the guidance in the checklist,
demonstrated this belief.
Most errors of commission were intended to
troubleshoot the failures, such as: advance the thrust
levers, verify the start levers are at idle, turn around to
exit the heavy rain that caused the failure, and
manually select both igniters. This last step
demonstrates a misunderstanding of the ignition
system. By correctly completing the recall item in the
checklist, both igniters were automatically energized.
When the situation called for a shutdown of both
engines, two pilots performed the additional step of
delaying 3 seconds between restart attempts. They
explained that this stemmed from a folk belief carried
over from their military background that additional
time was needed for excess fuel to clear the engine
before attempting a restart.
This disposition towards creative troubleshooting was
also seen in the Runaway Stabilizer Trim and Rapid
Depressurization checklists. Errors of commission
included moving the electric trim switches in the
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opposite direction and engaging the other autopilot.
One pilot reported that he had experienced a runaway
stabilizer in the past, and activating the electric trim
switches stopped the runaway. This is an example of a
pilot’s knowledge of the failure modes of a complex
system that could resolve the situation without using
a checklist.

demonstrated a misunderstanding of how the systems
in the 737 functioned. Other errors were a result of
either knowledge gained during a real experience in
the past, or a belief carried over from previous
organizations and airplanes, which may no longer
be applicable.
Implications

The rapid depressurization scenario showed that some
commission errors, such as closing the isolation valve
and ensuring the engine bleeds are on, would not
exacerbate the situation, but would not be beneficial
either. They would simply delay the completion of the
necessary steps. Moreover, the manual closing of the
isolation valve demonstrates a lack of understanding of
the bleed air system. This step is not required because
the valve is already closed during its normal operation.
On the other hand, some commission errors aggravated
the situation. An example was seen in some pilots’
willingness to allow the engines to overheat while
restarting after a dual engine failure. The consequence
of the overheating could be engine damage and a true
engine failure, instead of the original problem of a
temporary flameout due to an environmental condition
such as heavy rain, resulting in no engine damage.
Conclusion
The results demonstrate that pilots have difficulty
identifying the cause of the failure and selecting the
correct procedure. After identifying the situation,
knowledge of the appropriate memory items is such
that pilots commit errors in recall even during
unstressed conditions with a poster of the flight deck
for context.
None of the five failure scenarios in this study had a
distinct indicator light that would annunciate the
condition. Pilots were forced to analyze the cues and
determine the appropriate procedure. This is an
uncommon and involved task, and not performing it
may force pilots to complete only those tasks they are
familiar with, such as following an illuminated LOW
OIL PRESSURE light to the Low Oil Pressure
checklist during an aborted engine start, or fixating on
abnormal engine noises and performing the Engine
Fire/Severe Damage/Separation checklist, instead of
the more appropriate Engine Limit/Surge/Stall
checklist.
The observed checklist step errors showed that pilots
commit a number of errors. The majority of the
commission errors were steps performed by pilots to
resolve a failure based on their knowledge of the
airplane systems. Some of these commission errors

Even though the method used in this study did not
induce stress, it allowed for an evaluation of the pilots’
knowledge of the memory items without prior
preparation. Pilots generally perform well during their
PCs, and possibly better than inflight, because they
expect an evaluation and can prepare for it. Pilot
performance observed in this study may be closer to
that in an inflight emergency, in which the pilots are
unprepared to perform their memory items.
Clearly, an inflight emergency places a pilot under a
great deal of stress. Based on the literature review, it
can be inferred that errors similar to those observed
here may occur inflight during an actual emergency,
and may even occur more frequently due to increased
stress. Conducting a similar study in a full-flight
simulator may provide a level of stress similar to what
is experienced in a real emergency. The results
obtained from a simulator could be a more realistic
representation of the results obtained inflight.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Barbara Holder and Randy
Mumaw for their valuable guidance throughout the
course of this project. The author also wishes to thank
reviewers of drafts and the pilots who assisted by
reviewing and commenting on research methodology,
which greatly influenced the quality of data collected.
The author also wishes to thank those who gave their
time to allow us to gain some insight into the
challenges they face in the cockpit.
References
1. Baddeley, A. D. (2000). Selective attention and
performance in dangerous environments. Human
Performance in Extreme Environments, 5(1), 86-91.
(Reprinted from Baddeley, A. D. 1972. The British
Journal of Psychology, 63(4), 537-546.)
2. Hamman, W. R. (n.d.). Quick Reference
Checklist (QRC). United Airlines validation study.
Colorado: Author.

34

3. Idzikowski, C., & Baddeley, A. D. (1983). Fear
and dangerous environments. In D. H. Holding (Series
Ed.) & G. R. J. Hockey (Vol. Ed.), Stress and fatigue
in human performance (pp. 123-144). New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
4. Mosier, K. L., Skitka, L. J., Dunbar, M.,
McDonnell, L. (2001). Aircrews and automation bias:
The advantages of teamwork? International Journal of
Aviation Psychology, 11(1), 1-14.
5. Reason, James. (1990). Human Error. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
6. Salas, E., Driskell, J. E., & Hughes, S. (1996).
Introduction: The study of stress and human
performance. In E. A. Fleishman (Series Ed.) & J. E.

Driskell & E. Salas (Vol. Eds.), Stress and human
performance (pp. 1-45). New
Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
7. Skitka, L. J., Mosier, K. L., Burdick, M.,
Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation bias and errors: Are
crews better than individuals? International Journal of
Aviation Psychology, 10(1), 85-97.
8. Thompson, L. A., Williams, K. L., L’Esperance,
P. R., & Cornelius, J. (2001). Context-dependent
memory under stressful conditions: The case of
skydiving. Human Factors, 43(4), 611-619.
9. Wickens, C. D., & Hollands, J. G. (2000).
Engineering psychology and human performance. New
Jersey: Prentice Hall

35

